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{ {{{ « The transatlantic future is not what it used to be »}}} }
This sentence perfectly qualifies the richness and quality of the contributions and discussions that took place in the framework of the 2nd GlobalEurope 2020 session held in The Hague at the beautiful premises of the Clingendael Institute. Organised by Europe 2020 in cooperation with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this meeting was concerned about identifying paths for a common European policy on Transatlantic relations. The importance of the theme and the interest of the approach chosen (a European seminar on transatlantic issues, and not a transatlantic seminar) were confirmed by a high level and numerous audience (65 participants) coming from 25 different states. The consistency of European participants’ opinions and analyses was remarkable and remarked by every one; after the transatlantic chaos experienced in 2003, this is already an important information.
{
In this document, Europe 2020 has tried to sum up the discussions to 6 key-ideas followed by 7 propositions:}
1. As a result of post-1989 developments and recent crises (Iraq namely), Europeans no longer consider the transatlantic relation the way they have since 1945: out of the three historic pillars of the transatlantic relation, two are in open crisis and the third one remains solid but raises many problems.
2. This evolution concerns all Europeans and relates to a general context of profound changes within the EU: Europe in 2010/2020 has nothing in common with Europe in the past decades. Times of construction are becoming times of management and governance of a 500 million citizen-EU made up of 30 different nationalities.
3. Participants reminded that Europeans remain overwhelmingly convinced of the importance of the transatlantic relation in the 21st Century; however, they expressed their feeling that it will be difficult to adapt this relation to 21st Century requirements.
4. Incomprehension of multilateralism on the American part conveys great worries as to the future of transatlantic relations.
5. Europeans will place the future transatlantic relation in a global context; their conviction that 21st Century world will be a better one if Americans and Europeans get on well both motivates and limits future EU-US relations.
6. Three conditions to succeed in the future transatlantic relation: training future players, agreeing on the game’s goals, defining new common rules.
A. To communicate and discuss the EU and its positions with the American citizens
B. To contribute to fill the US intellectual deficit in terms of complexity and multilateralism
C. To contribute to forge the common intellectual tools for the identification of risk, threats and dangers; as well as the methods of common intervention
D. To generate a large Transatlantic debate about the democratization process of Middle East
E. To draw the map of EU/US inter-institutional relations, identifying American human flows towards the European common and national institutions; and vice-versa
F. To stimulate a European then transatlantic reflexion on the UN reform; based in particular on a proposition for a single European representation at the top of each major international institution
G. To endow the European representation in the US with some political visibility, likely to rid the EU of its dull bureaucratic image
{{{_________}}}
{{1. As a result of post-1989 developments and recent crises (Iraq namely), Europeans no longer consider the transatlantic relation the way they have since 1945: out of the three historic pillars of the transatlantic relation, two are in open crisis and the third one remains solid but raises many problems.}}
The transatlantic relation as we have experienced it in the last decades emerged at the end of the Second World War and was extended to the entire European continent from 1989 onward. It was built on the basis of three fundamental pillars: EU and US common security challenges, common values, and mutual economic interests. In the two coming decades, each of these three components will have to be entirely reviewed as a result of the present and future changes taking place both in Europe and in North America, and of course in the rest of the world.
{Security} – Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War (which justified the extension to the whole continent of the relation first built between the US and Western Europe) initiated a major break, i.e. a structural weakening, of the perception of common threats. Indeed, contrary to the 1945-1989 era, Europeans no longer feel that some major threats lie heavy on their continent; while on the contrary, the September 11th attacks have generated a new feeling of vulnerability in the US. The Iraq crisis in 2003 directly illustrates this evolution, initiating a divergence between the public opinion in the EU and in the US and resulting in those strong political confrontations between leaders of countries otherwise members of the same military alliance, i.e. NATO. In the EU, while public opinion soon converged towards three key-ideas (central role of the UN, respect of international law and rejection of the concept of « pre-emptive war »), the leaders endorsed three different types of positions: full support to Washington’s position claiming immediate and direct threats requiring pre-emptive military action; support to the US ally due to historical commitment with limits on sharing the analysis and the recommendation; refusal of the analysis and recommendation in favour of pre-emptive war. As a result of developments of the Iraq crisis (which invalidated most analyses used to justify pre-emptive war and gave evidence of the great complexity in managing the after-war against Saddam Hussein), the seminar showed remarkable convergence of analyses among participants who underlined the now general questioning that prevails in Europe on the nature and the future of transatlantic relations. Those questions raised by the Iraq crisis will have to be answered in order to prevent the central pillar of our common security from collapsing.
{Common values} – The risk of collapse is all the stronger since the consequences of the September 11th attacks remain differently perceived in Europe and in the US. While the need for an efficient and sustainable fight against terrorism is shared by both European and North-American governments, the notion of efficiency is not assessed in the same way by Europeans and Americans (knowing that Canada and Mexico are here closer to European positions). While Washington implements mostly military (even the war in Iraq was presented as a component of the fight against terrorism) or police responses (reinforcement of anti-terrorist legislations; limitations to civil rights, those of foreigners namely), Europeans feel that the terrorist issue is a lot more complex, requiring multi-sectoral treatment of its social, economic and political causes. They also increasingly wonder about the legitimacy, efficiency and finality of those legal measures that restrain individual liberties, and question the fact that terrorism is the only major problem to which our planet is confronted today and in the future. Such divergence of analysis reaches far beyond the case of war against terrorism (about which one participant reminded that it was only a method, meaning that « war against terrorism » sounded a bit as if in 1939-1945, we had declared war on the « blitzkreig » rather than on nazism – ideology – or Hitler). The whole situation contributes to erode seriously the pillar of EU-US common values. To sum up a general feeling in the seminar, one speaker (though a fervent pro-Atlantacist since decades) openly wondered whether US and EU values would still be common by 2020.
{Economy} – Regarding the third historical pillar of the transatlantic relation inherited from the 2nd World War (Economy), positions converge as to its growing importance but diverge as to its trend of evolution.
The importance of transatlantic trade and investments (2,000 billion dollars in 2002) appeared as the reason why those two regions are the most tightly intermingled in the world, as it created extremely powerful solidarities and mutual interests. However the increasing EU-US trade conflicts, though relatively weak (less than 1% of total exchanges), were presented as affecting negatively in the long-run the political relations prevailing between the two entities.
The Euro contributed to create an entirely new situation, unprecedented from a transatlantic perspective, giving existence to Europe next to the Dollar. The full measure of the financial and economic implications of the Euro has not yet been taken, but the Iraq crisis showed that the Euro created a totally new situation for Washington as it neutralised all attempts to mark out currency-wise this or that European ally for its behaviour. In parallel to this, the emergence of new significant economic players at the global scale (cf Cancun) opens a new era for transatlantic economic relations providing new cooperation opportunities for Europeans and Americans to influence together a more complex and open game; but also likely to lead each player to find new alliances.
In this beginning of 2004, it appears to Europeans that out of the three historic pillars of the transatlantic relation, two are in open crisis and the third one, though solid, conveys many problems. The seminar’s discussions also highlighted an often forgotten obvious fact: the pillars of the transatlantic relation are no « gifts of God », they are the construction of men and women from after 1945. They are no historic datum, but a variable resulting from the will and attention EU and US societies pay them.
{{2. This evolution concerns all Europeans and relates to a general context of profound changes within the EU: Europe in 2010/2020 has nothing in common with Europe in the past decades. Times of construction are becoming times of management and governance of a 500 million citizen-EU made up of 30 different nationalities.}}
Due to this evolution, the Europeans distance themselves from the transatlantic relation inherited from the second world conflict, and wonder what could the EU-US relation be in the future.
Of course, the EU is not a homogenous group, neither in its vision of nor in its historic relation to the US, nor in its perception and capacity of action within the different sectors of the transatlantic relation. However the now continental integration of Europe (from May 2004 onward) is a reality in a growing number of sectors affecting the three pillars of the transatlantic relation.
It was in this sense significant that the Iraq crisis, far from thrusting the EU into a deepening division as regards to external policy or security and defence strategies, on the opposite enabled Europe to strengthen in operational terms (Berlin +, interventions in Bosnia, Ivory Coast, Afghanistan) and in political terms (adoption of the Solana document presenting in detail for the first time a common strategy in that matter).
Participants to the seminar have thus given evidence of the fact that in the coming decades, from the European side, the transatlantic relation would in each field obey to some consistent strategies and objectives (ensuring to Europe the means of its prosperity, security and promotion of its values and interests) but would be elaborated and implemented by different actors: institutional ones (ECB for Euro, Commission for trade relations, pionneer-group for Defence – Berlin + – and Foreign Policy….), as well as economic operators and, increasingly, civil society players (universities, NGOs…), as recent history has shown how much the public opinion and its relays could influence decisively the transatlantic relation.
Europe in the coming decades will certainly be a political entity very far from the US federal model; more polycentric in its decision-making processes, more multilateral in its internal functioning, it will also present the characteristic to have its foreign relations (including relations with the US) engaged in a public debate due to the strong constraint of defining these policies among multiple Members States (at least 25). The ongoing debate on the European democratic deficit shows how much policy elaboration (transatlantic as much as many others) will soon no longer be in the hands of restricted circles, but will be influenced by the European public opinion.
This 500 million citizen-Europe will try to make its way to the 21st century globalised world, and the transatlantic relation will only be one parameter and not an intangible datum. One participant brilliantly expressed that “the only thing we can be sure of today is that there will be many transatlantic common relations rather than one transatlantic common policy”. This multiplicity is both a strong characteristic of the future of Europe and of its vision of the world, and a cause of transatlantic incomprehension and opposition.
{{3. Participants reminded that Europeans remain overwhelmingly convinced of the importance of the transatlantic relation in the 21st Century; however, they expressed their feeling that it will be difficult to adapt this relation to 21st Century requirements.}}
While Europeans are aware of the fact that they need to become credible in a number of fields (defence, security, economic growth), they also claim the need for an equal partnership with the US to found the transatlantic relation of the next decades. This claim is not an irresponsible request from countries neglecting their defence and military but, from a European point of view, a legitimate requirement related to historical changes.
Despite many weaknesses, the EU has today become the most attractive political model in the world. From South American ((Mercosur) to Asia (ASEAN) or Africa (OAU, AMU), all continents follow closely or get their inspiration from the European experience in order to anticipate their own changes. The EU demographic weight will be twice that of the US at the end of this decade, while its economic weight will about the same. Its military expenditures already rank second worldwide even though still inadapted (still oriented by Cold War choices) and fragmented; all elements which the EU has actively undertaken to reform. Its development aid is by far the first in the world. Eventhough the EU remains too much scattered politically speaking (the question of the European seat at the Security Council is a catalyst of any UN reform), its action within the UN makes it one of the pillars of the international organisation (a situation greatly reinforced since the Iraq crisis). With the Euro, the EU now owns one of the three sole currencies of world scope. Finally, by completing with success its enlargement eastward, the EU closes a long era of transition and proves its capacity to export sustainable stability.
Fo Europeans, and with the limitations mentioned before concerning the need to treat a number of weaknesses acknowledged by all participants in the seminar, the future of the transatlantic relation now depends on the answer given to their request for a balanced partnership. From Washington’s capacity to understand this aspiration and to formulate appropriate responses, will depend the sustainability of a 60 year old alliance. The age and intensity of this relation should plead in favour of an optimism which however did not show from the discussions.
{{4. Incomprehension of multilateralism on the American part conveys great worries as to the future of transatlantic relations.}}
The United States’ recent policy seems to worry even the most pro-atlantic ones; not necessarily due to the choices made but because of the methods used, explanations (or lack of explanations) given and more generally appearance of short-sightedness concerning changes in Europe. To make it short, many participants expressed their conviction that present American elites no longer understood Europe (and that, even if this lack of understanding was particularly marked today, it dated from farther back than the present presidency). A converging statement took form: in the US, and first of all among their elites, the capacity to understand the world has considerably regressed compared to a few decades ago. Their rejection of multilateralism is less the result of an objective analysis of the superiority of unilateralism, than the result of most US decision-makers’ incapacity to understand and master the multilateral dimension and its corresponding institutions/instruments (WTO, UNO…) In fact, many problems seem to be a matter of American elites finding it difficult to envisage complexity.
This intellectual deficit in the US is heavy of consequences and has already begun to influence our future. Future American elites are trained along the same lines as in the 60s, even though the position of the US on the world scene has considerably evolved since that time. Beyond the elites’ case, the shortage of human flows that used to energize the transatlantic relation is another source of worry.
After the great European migrations that built the basis of the transatlantic link, American popular stratas have been able to experience some direct relation to Europe via the US troops presence in Europe. This flow has run dry in the last decade.
Today only remains a few very elitist human flows (scientists, diplomats, militaries, businessmen and academics) next to some superficial tourist flows, while the populations of both sides of the Atlantic are more and more affected by the decisions made by each other’s partner.
The weakness of human and intellectual flows is reinforced by their unbalance. Indeed, most instruments aimed at stimulating intellectual exchanges between the two sides date back to 1945 and to Europe’s reconstruction efforts. Their operators are mostly Americans, anchored in visions elaborated in the 70s, focused on Washington, Brussels, and a few capitals (eg. the German Marshal Fund), used to an elitism inherited from those times when a few men only made the transatlantic relation; in other cases these operators have purely suppressed their programmes (eg. most US foundations) because they could not find any reasons to renew them; or the exchanges merely consist of university flows oriented from Europe to the US with the personal carrier as sole motivation.
In any case, while European populations are well energized by the transatlantic debate (via the media or the many transatlantic conferences organised all over the European territory), US populations are nearly never exposed to these issues.
Some initiatives in the 90s (around the NTA, with the « transatlantic dialogs » and the « transatlantic university networks ») tried to rebalance things by building partnerships between operators from both civil societies. Wanted by the institutions, concentrated on actors close these very institutions and elaborated as forced marriages, all these attempts failed. Two projects only were sustainable: the European Centers supported by the European Parliament and born by American universities; and TIESWEB, the only transatlantic webportal dedicated to the actors of both civil societies. The two initiatives feature a strong involvement of grass-root actors, an anchorage in the « real country » (and not among the institutions and immediate surroundings) and the expressed will to associate American citizens (and/or « communities ») rather than Europeans alone.
Europe will no longer let its image and relations be debated without itself and on the sole territory of its partner. The supposed lack of interest of the American public opinion appears more and more like an easy excuse for leaders to prevent external policy to become a theme of public debate. The democratic arena in Europe being wide open to US operators, Europe must in turn invest in the democratic arena in the US in order to present its developments and expectations.
Beyond the case of Europe, the weakness of education and information provided to US citizens about the rest of the world is a growing European preoccupation. The perpetuation of this situation, without some vigorous action being undertaken on the part of American decision-makers, will widen the gap of incomprehension between Europe and the US; but also between the US and the rest of the world. Some participants reminded that the EU was never alone, quite the contrary in fact, in the conflicts that opposed the US to WTO.
{{5. Europeans will place the future transatlantic relation in a global context; their conviction that 21st Century world will be a better one if Americans and Europeans get on well both motivates and limits future EU-US relations.}}
This conviction will be the main reason why Europeans between now and 2020 will want to reinforce, and therefore renovate, the transatlantic relation inherited from 1945. It was said on many occasions during the seminar that the Europeans no longer felt some direct major threats in a predictable future. As long as this situation will last, they will envisage the “security” pillar of the transatlantic relation through the prisma of global threats and dangers. Terrorism is one of them, but in the sense of a serious symptom of the enormous global unbalances in the field of development, education and democracy. If the transatlantic relation remains focused on the symptoms rather than on the causes, then the Europeans will soon drift away from it. Similarly, if the treatment of these dangers remains purely military and isolates, see endangers, the basic principles of privacy, freedom of expression and fundamental rights, the number of EU-US conflicts will increase.
Finally, if the US persist in refusing to contribute to set up some multilateral institutions separating executive from legislative and judicial powers (such as the International Criminal Court), these conflicts will become profound divergences.
Contrary to Washington, the Europeans feel greatly concerned by the fast emergence of a number of objective dangers such as poverty, epidemics, global warming, water and energy shortages…, which they see as the real threats in the middle- and long-term influencing collective security. From this point of view, US rejection of multilateral approaches aimed at dealing with these questions contributes to reinforce durably among the European public opinion and decision-makers of the Old Continent the will to forge other alliances than the transatlantic one. This question of risk analysis and of its perception will be at the centre of the challenge of building the future transatlantic relation (the precautionary principle and related transatlantic conflicts in the field of food illustrates this trend).
In the field of defence, if it is a duty for Europeans to organise their instruments, it is essential that the aims of the « transatlantic Alliance » (the only one really formalized) are adapted to the European requirement for parity in decision-making processes (as well of course as in the responsibility and burden). A question has to be addressed, today only emerging in the European public opinion but likely to become haunting in the case of a new Iraq-like situation, and it is the question of the democratic legitimacy of NATO decisions, especially when a profound disagreement divides its members. Moreover, the restriction of its membership to Europe and North America while its action intends to become more and more global, raises a growing number of questions in European minds. Enlargement of NATO to other democratic countries, located in other regions of the world, would become a theme of transatlantic debate in the next decades.
Similarly, the reccurent idea (recently re-launched by Spain) to create one large single transatlantic market will be envisaged by the Europeans through the prism of its impact on global trade processes. Would it contribute or not to strengthen global negotiations? Would it be to their detriment? To the detriment of other areas ? Here again, as Europe will gradually position itself on a global scale, it will oppose attempts to shut itself into some closed club, cut off from its environment.
If the relation between Europeans and Americans appears able to impact favourably on these collective issues, the Europeans will engage again with enthusiasm into the transatlantic partnership. But this very question of impact, requires from Washington far greater consideration for European preoccupations. If the Europeans estimate that this relation brings too few elements, see that it could have a negative impact on these global issues, the transatlantic relation will progressively be reduced to punctual and limited agreements.
{{6. Three conditions to succeed in the future transatlantic relation: training future players, agreeing on the game’s goals, defining new common rules.}}
For all seminar’s participants, it is obvious that our two continents are placed at a historic crossroads. The order established after 1945 has vanished in the past. Global strength relations in the coming 20 years are of a very different nature than those that have prevailed in the last 60 years. On both sides of the Atlantic, generations totally unrelated to the Second World War, or even to the Cold War, will come to power by the end of this decade. The dual and highly elitist relations that prevailed in the years of foundation of the transatlantic relation in the second half of the 20th century, are replaced by far more complex relations, involving many more players, public opinion included, and from now on anchored in an multiple forces environment. So that this relation remains a positive-sum game, as it has been for 60 years (explaining its intensity and duration), it is urgent to train the future players, define the common rules, and agree on the game’s aim. If we do not succeed doing this by 2010, the privileged relation Europeans and Americans have experienced in the past decades will belong to the past; and somehow the world will be less safe.
The Europeans will watch closely the outcome of the forthcoming election, even if some of the trends they are worried about will in any case remain as they are trends of the American society at large. Their expectations in terms of « fellowship » and no longer of « followship » is not incompatible with an American « leadership » as one participant stated. But in this case, the US must endorse a modern “leadership” based on networking and team management; rather than on « caporalism » and hierarchical authority.
It is anyway necessary to think about the sense of tomorrow’s transatlantic relation and about the means to communicate this sense to the public. In this respect, it could be useful to meditate over the Franco-German relation and its mechanisms and instruments, in order to determine whether some aspects are not applicable to the EU-US relation. Of course, as one participant remarked, Franco-German relations are founded on the rubble of war. But nothing prevents us from finding another way to found a healthy and durable relation.
{{{_________}}}
In conclusion, and because History does not wait and because Europeans must rise to their aspirations, here is a list of 5 strategic directions and tangible projects intended to have durable impact in the coming decades, which Europeans could set up already this year:
{{A. To communicate and discuss the EU and its positions with the American citizens}}
To stimulate the emergence of European players and of American centres of communication, presentation and debate on the EU and on its transatlantic or global positions. All over the European territory, transatlantic debates are numerous, often supported by American operators; but in the US, outside the Washington/New-York/Boston triangle and its elites, hardly any transatlantic debate is available. However in Kansas City, Miami, Chicago, Denver or Phoenix, many operators (associations, schools, colleges, universities, local authorities) would be interested by these themes should they have the possibility to discuss them. It is therefore urgent that Europe endows itself with the operators able to act directly or to support direct actions of European information/communication on the US territory. The experience of the 90s should incite not to entrust the European institutions with the command of this type of operation. Their success directly relates to the involvement of civil society actors, and characteristics of flexibility and reactivity. It is essential to complete the very insufficient European range of tools that rely on national operators (private or public) unable to present on their own a consistent image of the EU. Two directions can be envisaged:
{I. Creation of a « European Foundation of Transatlantic Relations »}, settled in an important city of a transatlantically-speaking strongly connected member state. Endowed with a limited budget (2 million euro/year) provided by Member States and European institutions as well as by the private sector, it would aim at supporting sustainable initiatives, covering large parts of the US society or territory, focusing on projects conducted/implemented by Europeans below 40 years old. It would not finance study trips, « high level » transatlantic seminars, nor long-term trainings, all these aspects being already largely covered by the existing transatlantic operators.
{II. Strengthening of the network of European Centers}, entrusting some of them with different dominant specialities (research, communication, information, … ) :
A network-based management is key to avoid deperdition. Their geographic distribution is large but must not at the expense of the network’s efficiency. Their funding should be guaranteed in the long-term under reserve of regular independent evaluations. They should become the basis of an autonomous appropriation of the intellectual contents of the European construction by the American academic system.
{{B. To contribute to fill the US intellectual deficit in terms of complexity and multilateralism}}
The context of the transatlantic game in the 21st century already presents some visible characteristics. Multilateralism will be the dominant form of international relations. The emergence of new powerful global players (China, Brazil, South Africa, Russia) and of major regional entities (UE, Mercosur, Asean) is patent already today. The exorbitant price paid by the US for their unilateral policy in Iraq (financial, political and moral cost) confirms this trend. But in order to compose easily with a « multilateral » world, one needs some elites and a public opinion trained to understand its challenges, methods and requirements. But today the quasi-absence of any international-oriented US elites and citizens leads the US decision-making system to favour the unilateral path mostly because it is unable to choose another one. In its own interest, as well as in the interest of its transatlantic partner, the EU must by all means try to remedy to this serious deficit. For this purpose, apart from the following propositions which all aim more or less to the same objective, the EU could set up a double training programme aimed for US elites:
{I- In Europe}, training to the trans-European management model (companies, institutions, association networks…) aimed for young or future American professionals from both public and private sectors
{II- In the US}, training to trans-cultural management on the basis of the European Union Centers (diplomas)
Moreover the EU could officially raise among federal, national and local US authorities the question of international education, including teaching of foreign languages, of history and geography. These are part of the basic curriculum of any citizen in a democratic country in the 21st century.
{{C. To contribute to forge the common intellectual tools for the identification of risk, threats and dangers; as well as the methods of common intervention}}
As said on many occasions during the seminar, the divergence in risk analysis and perception is increasing. It is therefore urgent to launch a training programme aimed for young experts to develop common tools of analysis; and to elaborate on this basis common instruments of intervention. Mingling governments, European institutions, research centers and NGOs, this initiative could take the form of a network significantly financed by the EU and based on the main European centers of excellence in that field (in would propose significant grants to attract US partners).
{{D. To generate a large Transatlantic debate about the democratization process of Middle East}}
Both continents are now convinced that Middle East region chronic instability is a direct threat to world peace. Both continents do agree that the lack of democratization of Arab states is a major cause of this instability. Then, Americans and Europeans seem to diverge on other causes and on ways and means for helping the region to move towards a peaceful integration to 21st Century world.
Therefore it is urgent for Europe to launch a series of initiatives aiming at bringing European and American experts, scholars, civil society officials and business executives to debate this core issue: how to democratize the Arab world?
{{E. To draw the map of EU/US inter-institutional relations, identifying American human flows towards the European common and national institutions; and vice-versa}}
Each year, thousands of European and American experts and civil servants are exchanged among EU institutions and European governments on the one hand, and US federal and national institutions on the other hand. No one in Europe has the slightest global visibility on the process. However it is necessary to determine precisely how these flows are organized in order to optimize and strengthen cooperation between the two continents.
{{F. To stimulate a European then transatlantic reflexion on the UN reform; based in particular on a proposition for a single European representation at the top of each major international institution}}
Beyond the reforms needed in the field of defence, armament, anti-proliferation,… there is one field in which the EU can no longer make the economy of some credibility vis-a-vis its US partner when it comes to global security, and it is the UN reform. The UN, as much as the transatlantic relation, is a product of the 2nd World War; their reforms are therefore closely related. The presence of two European permanent seats at the Security Council (as much as that of non permanent European seats) raises the question of Europe’s capacity to speak in one voice when global interests are at stake. According to European aspirations to influence the global scene and to balance its transatlantic partner, by 2020 Europe must have unified its system of representation within the UN (and other global organisations). The fact that this idea is considered as « taboo », in particular for France and the UK, will not prevent the question from being soon raised, and probably in a context of transatlantic debate. It is in the interest of the Europeans to engage as soon as today in this issue. Such an evolution taking place between now and 2010 would strongly contribute to renovate, rebalance and strengthen the EU-US partnership. European support to a series of works on this theme is becoming urgent.
{{G. To endow the European representation in the US with some political visibility, likely to rid the EU of its dull bureaucratic image}}
For years, the EU has been identified to Brussels and the Commission by political, economic, academic and media circles in Washington. It is important to “de-bureaucratize” this image which no longer corresponds to the EU reality; one where the Commission has been playing a lesser and lesser role along the last decade. The EU today and tomorrow is made up by companies, associations, universities, local authorities… Therefore we ought to present to the US a lively and dynamic institutional face; and make sure that EU officials sent there have a political, communicative profile, and are able to act as facilitators of the involvement of European civil society within the transatlantic debate.
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{This document is the sole responsibility of Europe 2020
And does not reflect the views of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs}
